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In 1935 workers' compensation came to Florida. We were not among the first to adopt this social safety net, in fact we were among the very last. Upon its two hypotheticals, and upon its finding of fact, the Court relied upon decisions by other states that had required medical mileage payments, including Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. On a side-note, appellate courts are generally expected to utilize the facts established in the record by lower tribunals, but there are those who advocate for appellate fact finding. The Minnesota case cited by the Florida Court reached its conclusion to award transportation based upon it being "humane" and that the law "should be liberally construed." Huhn v. Foley Bros., 221 Minn. N.W. 2d 3 (MN 1946). The Nebraska analysis is largely a deferral to the Minnesota analysis in Huhn. Newberry v. Youngs, 80 N.W. Finally, the Oklahoma case involved railroad fare, and reaches conclusions as to it being reimbursable without extensive elucidation.

Thus, in Mobley, Florida's Court added an element of benefit through inference. In part, at least, this interpretation was bounded upon the "liberally construed" foundation in Huhn. Though the original Florida workers' compensation law did not include statutory reference to "liberal construction," The Florida Court had, by 1964, long committed to that sentiment. In Parker v. Brinson Construction Company, Fla., 78 So. This perhaps ignores a curiosity or two. If it did not so intend, how and where is there a clear indication to the contrary? Some, perhaps, would find that clarity in its seeming adoption of Mobley in 1977? However, that might have been worthy of a sentence or two in Bair. But, in a broader sense, when the legislature in 1993 removed the medical transportation statute enacted in 1977, the "liberal construction" foundation upon which Mobley was built had been legislatively negated and disaffirmed. In point, the very foundation of the Mobley analysis no longer stood, and thus its precedential value was at least questionable by the District Court. For some reason, that distinction was interestingly not discussed by the Bair decision.

Possibly, the Court recognized and was unpersuaded by the resulting flaw in Mobley, but it is interesting that it was not explained. In this regard, the dissent of Justice Wells in Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. Justice Wells recognizes the import of section 440.015, and argues that the Florida Supreme Court reliance there on Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So. The work accident in Sibley was governed by the 1989 law. This is an intriguing history of Florida's workers' compensation evolution. The Court implied a benefit based upon imported Minnesotan, or broadly inferred, "liberal construction." Then followed a subsequent legislative enablement of that creation, a statutory transportation benefit published for 16 years. During that 16 years, the legislature specifically countermanded the "liberal construction" foundation of the Court's implied benefit. And, when the legislature later removed that statutory transportation benefit, the District Court concluded that the legislature nonetheless must have been legislatively endorsing the (then) thirty-year old Mobley inference decision that "liberally constructed" that benefit in the first instance. And, to make it all the more interesting the District Court chose not to explain the inference, the import of section 440.015, or the apparent foundational shift.

From the standpoint of legislatures, the lesson is perhaps that judicial shift may simply be easier than legislative change. It requires fewer votes and perhaps less time and process. Similarly, it often lacks broad public input that legislative process may provide. Some would note alternatively that judicial change may be more of a challenge as it nonetheless requires both a fitting case and controversy and a litigant with the resources to individually pursue the change. From the perspective of the courts, the path to a Minnesotan "liberal construction" is both curious and intriguing, but the later interpretation of the legislature's removal of that statutory benefit is more intriguing still. In retrospect, one might wonder if the patent change to that "liberal construction" was argued and ignored in Bair, or neglected by the parties. In a larger context, the "race to the bottom" argument needs to be considered in the broader nature of workers' compensation. Is it practical to conclude that legislative enactments are necessarily reducing benefits in the aggregate, or is it possible that such legislative action may merely address some judicially implied expansion of benefits, which legislatures perhaps did not intend?